Sunday, July 1, 2012

Antisocial

On Gizmodo, Sam Biddle asks the provocative question: "Does Google Have Any Social Skills At All?" Biddle questions whether, despite all the money that Google has poured into social media lately, the company really understands social at all.
We've had privacy concerns before, but could it be more? Could it be that Google just doesn't get real people?
Of course there's an unsavory normative quality to that question: Biddle presumes that his vision of "real people" is more valid than Google's. But at depth the article exposes a real quandary that Google must address as it attempts to make its products more sccial: not everyone shares the company's values.

It's a problem for any tech company. When you design, if you want to design well, you must design for yourself first. Begin by trying to make something that you want to use, and then maybe you'll design something that lots of other people want, too. Steve Jobs famously scoffed at the need for focus groups; when Apple designed the iPhone, he said, they were merely building the phone that they themselves wanted to use.

That may well have been true, but it would be a mistake to think that the iPhone was a design that began and ended with the sensibilities of engineers. Anyone who's spent time around developers knows that they love power and functionality. An engineer-designed product tends to have 20 buttons on the front, dials on the side, and an easy-access hatch on the back that allows you to swap out the motherboard and install custom cooling systems. It may be ugly as hell, but it does a lot of cool things (at least when it's working properly, which is sometimes) and it's fun to tinker with.

That is not the iPhone. The iPhone is a device that may have begun on an engineer's screen, but along the way it was filtered through the values and desires of Jobs and Jonathan Ive and what resulted was an embodiment of that image Jobs liked: a product at the intersection of technology and the humanities. It's the combination of those two qualities that makes the iPhone and iPad so distinct, and so controversial within the technology community. Many engineers hate exactly those things that consumers love about both devices. So what are the odds that engineers, left to their own devices, can develop anything with such broad appeal?

This is Google's quandary: it's a company of engineers run by other engineers. There are no significant clashes of culture internal to the building, so those clashes occur on the outside, when product (or product vision) encounters the marketplace filled with people like Biddle who do not share Google's values. Maybe Google's ahead of the game and everyone else just needs to catch up, or maybe they're blinded by an excess of engineers.

Monday, June 25, 2012

Fear the middle manager

Today while pondering Microsoft's pending acquisition of Yammer, I came across another corporate acquisition story: how WinAmp went from the cusp of domination in the digital music market to where it is now -- basically forgotten in the continental U.S. -- because of interference and indifference from its corporate overlords at AOL.

Whenever a story like this comes along, it's tempting to rant and rave at just how stupid corporate leaders can be. I mean, they thought highly enough of the company to buy it, but not enough to give it any air to breathe. That explanation doesn't really hold water, though; the managers at AOL didn't wander in off the street, and neither did the ones at Yahoo, Microsoft, HP, or any other major corporation. They got where they are because they're hard-working and reasonably astute. So how is it that, time after time, small companies with momentum get sucked up by larger units only to be destroyed from within?

As I was reading the article, I kept thinking back to a post that Seth Godin made some time ago, on the "hierarchy of business to business needs." Seth makes the point that, with the exception of the CEO and anyone who holds a lot of stock, the people who work there are not immediately focused on growth or profits. Instead, their highest needs are largely personal: the reduction of hassle and the avoidance of risk.

I could be wrong, but this is what I think tends to happen: startup companies are purchased at the instigation (or at least with the approval) of company leaders, who see the company's potential and want to add that to their own company's bottom line. Once in the door, though, those companies become subject to mid-level managers whose primary drive is avoiding risk and trouble. Those are two completely irreconcilable goals: you can't grow or disrupt or evolve without creating trouble for somebody, and now you're reporting to someone whose primary intention is to stop that from happening within his neck of the woods. From that perspective, it's not surprising that fast-rising companies sometimes fail when they're bought out. It's surprising that sometimes they succeed.

The way out of this scenario would seem to be the one that Amazon took when they bought Zappos: they left it running as a quasi-independent company, and it seems to be working out OK. If Yammer was able to negotiate a similar relationship with their new insect corporate overlords, things might go similarly well. You do have to wonder, though -- considering that Microsoft bought the company because they were beginning to disrupt the market dominated by SharePoint, how much room for disruption is there going to be now?

Xobni Apocalypse

I just un-installed Xobni. Allow me a moment to explain why you should care.

I used to think Xobni was cool. Working under a freemium model, it offered an extension to Outlook that dramatically improved the email search experience. It also had some social elements that I never really used, but I thought there was some potential there.

Somewhere along the way Xobni disappeared from my machine, and by the time I noticed the change and went back to re-install it, something had changed. Now Xobni was annoying. It was a serious drag on my day, because Xobni actively interfered with the creation of email -- every time I opened a new message window and started to type an address, Xobni would try to upsell me to the Pro edition by showing that its address book was so much more effective than Outlook's. The window dropped down far enough to cover the CC and Subject lines, and, worst of all, if Outlook recognized the name and auto-filled it, the Xobni box would enter the name a second time if I tabbed out of the address field. I had to learn an entirely new action -- click to exit the field, rather than using the tab key -- to fix a problem created by an overzealous marketing effort.

Presumably Xobni's freemium model isn't working out too well, but I don't care. I wasn't inclined to pay for the Pro account before, because I didn't see enough value there. Now that I'm expanding my definition of "four-letter word" to include the occasional five-letter exception like "xobni," they have lost me for good.

Marketing is a delicate effort. On the business side, it's driven by the urgent need to make money, pay the bills, and satisfy the shareholders. The mandate is on the business, though, to put that aside and look at things from the customer's point of view. If your marketing effort makes things worse for your potential customers, even if you manage to convert some of them in the process, you are destroying your brand and sentencing your company to a long and lingering death. This is the road that Real Networks went down, and the outcome is not pretty.

Marketing is not about what you want, it's about what your customers want. Forget that at your peril.